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Abstract
Detecting manipulations in digital documents is becoming in-
creasingly important for information verification purposes.
Due to the proliferation of image editing software, altering
key information in documents has become widely accessi-
ble. Nearly all approaches in this domain rely on a procedu-
ral approach, using carefully generated features and a hand-
tuned scoring system, rather than a data-driven and general-
izable approach. We frame this issue as a graph comparison
problem using the character bounding boxes, and propose
a model that leverages graph features using OCR (Optical
Character Recognition). Our model relies on a data-driven ap-
proach to detect alterations by training a random forest classi-
fier on the graph-based OCR features. We evaluate our algo-
rithm’s forgery detection performance on dataset constructed
from real business documents with slight forgery imperfec-
tions. Our proposed model dramatically outperforms the most
closely-related document manipulation detection model on
this task.
Introduction
The use of digital documents for information verification
is becoming increasingly common in domains such as fi-
nance, insurance, and administration. For example, digital
documents may be used for the purpose of filing insur-
ance claims, verifying address or income, or expense man-
agement. As these use cases increase, opportunities for de-
ception through document manipulation naturally follow, as
successful forgery of these types of documents can lead to
personal reward. Recent technological advances have made
manipulation of digital documents easier than ever, allowing
forgers to cheaply manipulate key portions of a document.
These portions may include information such as account bal-
ance, address, name, or salary. Using simple image editing
software, forgers can alter a few characters or words in the
document to achieve their purposes. This type of forgery is
particularly difficult to mitigate as these types of documents
don’t contain extrinsic artifacts such as watermarks for au-
thentication purposes. Any method for detecting manipula-
tion in these types of documents must thus rely on the intrin-
sic properties of the document.
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Digital document manipulation occupies a unique place
within image manipulation detection, as properties such as
color or texture that are normally leveraged for manipula-
tion detection may not be as useful in digital documents. For
example, many digital documents contain little or no color,
and often an entirely white background. In addition, there
are a variety of mechanisms available to alter a character or
word in the document. The forger can copy and paste from
another portion of the document, splice from a separate doc-
ument, or construct the character from scratch by changing
individual pixels (see Figure 1).
Manipulation detection methods for both images and doc-
uments rely on imperfections in the forgery process. In doc-
uments, these imperfections are often found in the align-
ment and sizing of the forged character (van Beusekom and
Shafait 2011). We propose a method for detecting these
forgery imperfections in document manipulation using OCR
(Optical Character Recognition) graph features. We frame
the problem of manipulation detection as a graph compar-
ison problem, in which each character in the document is
considered as the central node of a sub-graph within the
larger graph of the document. Each sub-graph contains in-
formation about the central node and its neighbors, includ-
ing features such as OCR box size, distance from the central
node and alignment. We then train a random forest to recog-
nize sub-graphs in which the central node has been manipu-
lated.
We construct a dataset which directly measures the abil-
ity of our model to detect these types of imperfections
by stochastically shifting or scaling characters documents.
Constructing this type of dataset constrains the model to rely
on forgery imperfections, as texture or pixel-based features
may be distorted or removed through post-processing like
printing and scanning, Gaussian blurring or JPEG compres-
sion (Bayar and Stamm 2016).
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We are the first to consider the problem of document ma-
nipulation as a graph comparison problem and to leverage
OCR features as graph features for manipulation detec-
tion. Our proposed method significantly outperforms the
most closely related model designed for document manip-
ulation detection.
• We present a data-driven approach that uses a random
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Figure 1: Three possible manipulation types in document forgery include pixel manipulation, copy-move, and splicing. In pixel
manipulation, individual pixels are manipulated to change the character. In this case, the gap in the ’c’ is filled in to become
an ’o’. In copy-move, the character is copied and pasted from another part of the document. In splicing, the character is copied
and pasted from another document. In this case, font differences can be observed under careful inspection.
forest architecture, in contrast with the procedural ap-
proaches previously employed for detecting forgeries.
• We evaluate our algorithm on a dataset that directly mea-
sures the ability of a manipulation detection model to de-
tect forgery imperfections.
Related Work
Manipulation Detection in Images
Digital document manipulation detection occupies a space
within image manipulation detection more broadly and
builds upon work in this area. For example, (Fridrich,
Soukal, and Lukas 2003) investigate detection of copy-move
forgery in images using block matching methods. (Lin et al.
2009) develop a method for detecting copy-move forgery
in images using Hu moment features on blocks of pixels.
(Popescu and Farid 2005) use a pixel-based method for re-
sampling using the statistical artifacts created during the
manipulation operation. (Stamm and Liu 2010) use a sim-
ilar approach for detecting contrast enhancement, histogram
equalization and JPEG-compression.
However, documents present unique challenges and op-
portunities when compared with manipulation detection in
images. For example, as noted by (Lin et al. 2009), one chal-
lenge in detecting copy-move forgeries in images is trying to
compare every possible pair of pixel blocks. In contrast, in
documents this number of comparisons can be drastically
reduced by ignoring white space and only comparing boxes
containing the same alphanumeric character. Additionally,
methods designed for forgery detection in images that lever-
age texture or pixel-based statistical properties may perform
worse on documents due to large amounts of white space
and less color information, as well as the potential for print-
ing and scanning documents and removing these features.
Our proposed model in particular attempts to leverage the
structured and predictable nature of documents to develop
more discriminative features.
Manipulation Detection in Documents
Several methods for detecting forgeries rely on identifying
the type of printer or exact machine from which a document
was printed (van Beusekom, Shafait, and Breuel 2013a;
Shang, Memon, and Kong 2014). In contrast, (Ahmed and
Shafait 2014) use intrinsic document elements, or portions
of the document that remain the same across different copies
of the document, to detect manipulations in documents from
the same source. (Bertrand et al. 2015) employ a conditional
random field model and font features to detect manipula-
tions in which a character or word has been spliced from a
document with different fonts. (Abramova et al. 2016) inves-
tigate methods for detecting copy-move forgery in scanned
text documents using block-based methods on characters
that have been copied onto a ”forgery” line at the bottom
of the page. (van Beusekom, Shafait, and Breuel 2013b)
develop a method using text-line alignment and skew fea-
tures to determine the authenticity of each line on the page,
in contrast with other works (including ours) that exam-
ine alterations on a word or character level. (Shang, Kong,
and You 2015) use geometric properties of characters to
distinguish between documents printed from laser printers,
ink printers, and electrostatic copiers for purposes of doc-
ument authentication. (Cruz et al. 2017) use Otsu bina-
rization to extract patches to compare using local binary
pattern features combined with a Support Vector Machine
(SVM) for forgery classification. (Van Beusekom, Stahl,
and Shafait 2012) present findings from deploying manip-
ulation techniques on real-world datasets to identify weak-
nesses. (Chernyshova et al. 2019) propose a system for op-
tical font recognition for the purpose of forgery detection.
(Sidere et al. 2017) publish a dataset for evaluating perfor-
mance on forgery detection in French payslips. (Gupta and
Kumar 2020) explore the benefits of using boosting and bag-
ging in forgery detection.
Methodology
We frame the manipulation detection problem in documents
as a graph comparison problem, where each character is the
center of a graph containing 2n+ 1 nodes, consisting of the
central character node and n nodes on each side horizon-
tally. We experiment with various values of n, ranging from
3-9 (see Table 1). We attempt to include only nodes that are
on the same line of text by measuring the difference in the
y-values of each node in comparison with the heights. Ex-
perimentally, we found that when the difference between the
y-values of the top of the OCR boxes was less than .85 of the
height of the taller box, the boxes were on the same line. In
other words, nodes n1 and n2 are considered to be on the
same line when
|y0n1 − y0n2| < (.85 ∗max(heightn1, heightn2) (1)
where y0n indicates the y-value of node n and heightn
corresponds to the height of node n. When the central node
fell near the left or right end of a line, we imputed the miss-
ing values with the values from the other side of the central
node when possible.
Each of the features of each node is concatenated into a
single vector to describe the sub-graph for each character in
the document. For training, we assign the label 1 when the
central node has been manipulated, and 0 when the central
node is pristine or unaltered. We then train a random forest
on the dataset.
The pseudo-code for reproducing our model is provided
in the supplementary materials.
Features
For each node in the sub-graph, we construct a set of features
to describe the node, including:
• Height and width: Tesseract OCR provides the bounding
box of each character, from which the approximate height
and width of the character can be determined. If a charac-
ter has been manipulated, imperfections in the manipula-
tion often manifest in a slight character size difference.
• Y-value Difference: We take the relative displacement of
neighbouring nodes along the y-axis. We consider the up-
permost y-value of the central node as 0, and compute the
positive or negative difference of the neighboring node
y-values with respect to the central node. This feature is
useful as a proxy for alignment error, as exact alignment
of the forged character is difficult to achieve even with
digital image manipulation tools.
• Distance: The Euclidean distance from the center of the
each node to the center of the central node is calculated.
Information about distance from the central node allows
greater weighting of nodes that are closer to the central
node. The distance is formulated as
d((x1, y1), (x2, y2)) =
√
(x1 − x2)2 + (y1 − y2)2 (2)
where (x1, y1), (x2, y2) refer to the center of the central
node character box and the center of a neighboring node
character box respectively.
• Hu Moments: The seven Hu moments are invariate to
rotation, scale and translation and allow for information
about the character value within the box (Hu 1962; Huang
and Leng 2010). The seven Hu moments are defined as
φ1 = η20 + η02
φ2 = (η20 − η02)2 + 4η211
φ3 = (η30 − 3η12)2 + (3η21 − µ03)2
φ4 = (η30 − η12)2 + (η21 − µ03)2
φ5 = (η30 − 3η12)(η30 + η12)[(η30 + η12)2 − 3(η21 + η03)2]
+ (3η21− η03)(η21 + η03)[3(η30 + η12)2 − (η21 + η03)2]
φ6 = (η20 − η02)[(η30 + η12)2 − (η21 + η03)2]
+ 4η11(η30 + η12)(η21 + η03)
φ7 = (3η21 − η03)(η30 + η12)[(η30 + η12)2 − 3(η21 + η03)2]
− (η30 − 3η12)(η21 + η03)[3(η30 + η12)2 − (η21 + η03)2]
(3)
where each normalized centroid moment ηpq is defined as
ηpq =
µpq
µγ00
, γ = (p+ q + 2)/2, p+ q = 2, 3, ... (4)
and each centroid moment µpq is is computed as
µp,q ==
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
(x− x)p(y − y)qf(x, y)dx, dy
p, q = 0, 1, 2... (5)
where the pixel point (x, y) is the centroid of the image,
or in our case, the centroid of the character bounding box.
• Principal Inertia Axis: The Principal Inertia Axis is ob-
tained through Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) on
the µ20 , µ11 and µ02 Hu moments.
Experiments
As described above, we construct a random forest using
Python (Van Rossum and Drake Jr 1995) and the sci-kit
learn library (Pedregosa et al. 2011). We ran randomized
hyper-parameter search for 480 iterations on search space
of the parameters listed in Table 1. Each experiment was run
on a cross-validation set of five folds, and the average per-
formance and standard deviation of the folds are reported in
the Results section. The experiments were performed on an
Intel Core i7-8700 machine with x86-64 architecture and 12
cores.
Figure 2: Our pipeline begins with extracting character bounding boxes using Optical Character Recognition (OCR) via Tesser-
act. The boxes are then used to construct graph features for each potentially manipulated character. In this figure, the ’K’ is the
character being examined for manipulation. Hu moments and principal inertia axis features are not shown. The graph features
are then inputted into a trained random forest, which classifies the character as manipulated or pristine.
Figure 3: The sub-graph contains the central node (red, ’P’), or the OCR character box being inspected for manipulation
artifacts, and n neighbors on either side (blue). Features include box characteristics such as height, width, respective y-value,
distance from the central node, Hu moments, and principal inertia axis.
Number of trees
1000, 250, 1500, 1750, 2000,
2250, 2500, 2750, 3000, 3250,
3500, 3750, 4000, 5000
Max tree depth 5, 10, 15, 20, 25,30, 35, 40, 45, 50
Minimum number of
samples per leaf 4, 6, 8, 10, 12
Number of Neighbors (n) 3, 5, 7, 9
Table 1: Hyper-parameter ranges for the proposed model
Dataset
Our dataset consists of 359 finance-related documents, in-
cluding bank statements, offer letters, credit card statements,
bills, and tax returns. We split the documents into train and
test sets, with 287 and 72 documents in each set respectively.
Each document has one or more pages, together totalling
1470 pages for training and 389 pages for testing.
Each document original is a PDF, for which the PDF text
boxes are stored in the document. The PDF is first converted
to an image, and as we iterate through the character boxes in
the document, we alter the box on the image through either
shifting or scaling with probability 0.05. Scaling or shift-
ing is applied stochastically within four ranges of values:
shifting 1-5px, shifting 5-10px, scaling 7%-14%, and scal-
ing 15%-25%. Empirically, we found that shifting or scal-
ing by values smaller than these did not change the size or
position of the character. Values larger than these produces
manipulations that were easily visible to the human eye and
often significantly disrupted the OCR extraction.
If the box is altered, we store the coordinates of the altered
box in the image for later use as ground truth. The resulting
dataset is a collection of PNG images of documents of which
5% of the characters have been altered through scaling or
shifting based on the PDF text boxes. Notably, the PDF text
boxes are not provided to the manipulation detection model,
and are distinct from the character boxes obtained through
Tesseract OCR. See Figure 4 for examples of scaling and
shifting.
While the original documents used for experimentation
cannot be shared due to their sensitive nature, we provide
pseudo-code in the supplementary materials for processing
the dataset which can be performed on any set of similar
real-world business documents.
Comparison
We compare our model’s performance with the system pro-
posed in (Bertrand et al. 2013), which similarly uses intrinsic
document features on the character level to detect character-
level manipulations. The proposed method also uses Tesser-
act OCR (Smith 2007) for character extraction. The authors
combine the results of two separate methods for classifica-
tion of characters as manipulated or pristine.
In the first method, the authors compute a distance be-
tween characters of the same alphanumeric type by con-
structing feature vectors consisting of the seven Hu moments
(Hu 1962; Terrades, Tabbone, and Valveny 2007) and cal-
culating the Euclidean distance. Character pairs are flagged
when the distance is either suspiciously small, indicating a
copy-move forgery, or suspiciously large, indicating a char-
acter that is of a different size or font than the other charac-
ters of the same type in the document.
In the second method, the authors propose finding a set
of forgery clues grouped by a vector W for each character.
The feature vector W consists of the character size based on
the bounding box as obtained through Tesseract OCR, the
character principal inertia axis as obtained through Singular
Value Decomposition (SVD) on the µ20 , µ11 and µ02 Hu
moments, and the character horizontal alignment on the line
level. The feature vector W of each character is then com-
pared to a data model Mc for that character alphabetic class
using the Mahalanobis distance, which is generated with the
document training set. Similar to the first method, a scoring
system determines if the distance is small enough or large
enough to arouse suspicion of manipulation.
Finally, the two indicators from the two methods are com-
bined to give each character a score, for a final classification
of manipulated or pristine.
This method is an appropriate comparison for our method
due to its similar character-based features and reliance on
Tesseract OCR for determining character bounding boxes.
Specifically, the feature extraction methods used by our
model are a subset of those used by the model proposed in
(Bertrand et al. 2013). Comparison with this model allows us
to disentangle the utility of the feature extraction employed
from the combined utility of the graph-based features and
the random forest architecture.
We performed random search on a range of values and
tune the hyper-parameters for a total of 480 iterations. The
ranges of each value are shown in Table 2.
Results
The results in Tables 3, 4 5, 6 indicate that while the model
proposed in (Bertrand et al. 2013) achieves a reasonable F1
score and high recall, it reports a high number of false pos-
itives. In contrast, our model is able to achieve impressive
Figure 4: An example of shifting (left) and scaling (right) manipulations. On the left, the six has been shifted up slightly to
mimic the y-value alignment artifact introduced during a copy-move, pixel adjusting, or splicing operation. On the right, the
seven has been slightly enlarged, as could be similarly expected during manipulation operations.
Method 1 Upper Threshold 80, 95, 90
Method 1 Lower Threshold 0, 5, 10
Mahalanobis Threshold 5, 6, 7
Log Transform Hu Moment Values True, False
Table 2: Hyper-parameter ranges used for training the model
described in (Bertrand et al. 2013)
Proposed
Method STD
Bertrand
2013 STD
Precision 0.8651 ± 0.0134 0.2927 ± 0.0144
Recall 0.7461 ± 0.0181 0.7862 ± 0.0170
Accuracy 0.9857 ± 0.0112 0.3790 ± 0.0128
F1 Score 0.8012 ± 0.0181 0.4265 ± 0.0170
Table 3: Mean metrics and standard deviations for scaling
5% of characters by a range of 15% to 25% for each of the
five splits
performance given even minute manipulations such as shift-
ing by a single pixel or scaling by as little as 7%. We ex-
pected a higher F1 score with the ”easier” or larger manipu-
lations than was achieved (see Tables 3 and 5), and hypothe-
size that larger manipulations may disrupt our models ability
to correctly distinguish between characters on the same line
and characters on different lines.
Conclusion
We present a system for detecting forgery imperfections
using OCR graph features with a random forest architec-
ture. We evaluate this algorithm on detecting small shift-
ing and scaling manipulations in real financial documents.
As shown, our model outperforms the most closely related
model significantly on this task. It seems that at least for
Proposed
Method STD
Bertrand
2013 STD
Precision 0.8709 ± 0.0143 0.2495 ± 0.0153
Recall 0.6177 ± 0.0221 0.7971 ± 0.0315
Accuracy 0.9817 ± 0.0212 0.3506 ± 0.0122
F1 Score 0.7228 ± 0.0210 0.3800 ± 0.0206
Table 4: Mean metrics and standard deviations for scaling
5% of characters by a range of 7% to 14% for each of the
five splits
Proposed
Method STD
Bertrand
2013 STD
Precision 0.8187 ± 0.0155 0.2111 ± 0.0166
Recall 0.7440 ± 0.0162 0.8047 ± 0.0161
Accuracy 0.9854 ± 0.0172 0.3318 ± 0.0146
F1 Score 0.7796 ± 0.0102 0.3343 ± 0.0106
Table 5: Mean metrics and standard deviations for shifting
5% of characters by a range of 5-10 pixels for each of the
five splits
Proposed
Method STD
Bertrand
2013 STD
Precision 0.8604 ± 0.0101 0.2498 ± 0.0091
Recall 0.6666 ± 0.012 0.7896 ± 0.014
Accuracy 0.9829 ± 0.0198 0.3494 ± 0.0111
F1 Score 0.7512 ± 0.0121 0.3795 ± 0.0116
Table 6: Mean metrics and standard deviations for shifting
5% of characters by a range of 1-5 pixels for each of the five
splits
documents, a data-driven approach may be required instead
of a procedural approach for obtaining satisfactory manipu-
lation detection results. In addition, it appears that leverag-
ing the structured nature of digital documents by incorporat-
ing graph features offers additional performance gains. The
unique nature of digital documents, and their importance in
manipulation detection research, warrants special attention
and inquiry into developing methods for identifying mali-
cious manipulations.
Future work could include leveraging graph anomaly de-
tection methods for a more efficient graph-based detection
system. Additionally, the OCR graph features could be com-
bined with pixel-based features from traditional image ma-
nipulation detection for potential improved performance.
We also observed that the character boxes resulting from
Tesseract OCR were sometimes inaccurate, failing to ac-
curately enclose each character. Improving the underlying
OCR method could further improve the manipulation detec-
tion results.
Ethics Statement
While detecting manipulations in documents can be reason-
ably assumed to be used for non-malicious purposes, a high
false-positive rate (such as that reported by our compari-
son model) could negatively impact individuals or groups.
For example, a document incorrectly labeled as manipulated
could prevent an individual from receiving a loan or jeopar-
dize employment if an expense report is incorrectly flagged
as forged. In addition, while outside the scope of this work,
it is possible that our manipulation detection model perfor-
mance varies on different languages, potentially exacerbat-
ing negative impact on certain groups of individuals. We,
the authors, recommend that entities seeking to employ doc-
ument manipulation detection algorithms proceed with cau-
tion by including stakeholders in the design process, priori-
tizing transparency, and regularly auditing systems for pre-
cision, recall, fairness, and bias.
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